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INTRODUCTION 
This article is a response to a series of recent and successful sexual offence prosecu-
tions brought against transgender and other gender non-conforming people for gender 
identity fraud in the UK,
1
 and specifically to Leveson LJ’s judgment in the English 
Court of Appeal decision of R v McNally.
2
 The decision is now the leading authority 
on sexual fraud generally, and gender identity fraud specifically, under English law. 
The response will take the form of an academic judgment, in this instance a dissenting 
or counter-judgment. The article will proceed as follows. First, it will present the facts 
of the McNally case. Second, it will provide some detail regarding the developing ju-
risprudence of the courts regarding sexual fraud. This will be kept to a minimum giv-
en that the counter-judgment will deal with relevant law at length. Third, it will pref-
ace the counter-judgment with an explanation of why an exercise in academic judge-
ment-writing is valuable. In this regard, the article will draw significantly on feminist 
judgment-writing projects. Fourth, the article will consider a queer approach to law, 
and will detail some queer principles around which the counter-judgment will be or-
ganised, while at the same time highlighting tensions between queer theory and en-
gagement with law and judgment. Finally, the article will present the counter-
judgment which will suggest McNally was wrongly decided.  
THE FACTS OF THE CASE 
The complainant and defendant met online through a social networking game. At this 
point, McNally, who used the name ‘Scott Hill,’3 was 13 and the female complainant 
12. Over three years later, during which time they continued their cyber relationship, 
the parties met in person and on several occasions. At this stage, McNally was 17 and 
the complainant 16. On two of these occasions McNally digitally and orally penetrat-
ed the complainant. Subsequently, the complainant ‘discovered’ McNally’s gender 
history and claimed to feel physically sick.
4
 The defendant was charged with six 
counts of assault by penetration,
5
 convicted and sentenced to three years detention in 
a young offender institution.
6
 The complainant’s consent to sex was found to have 
been vitiated due to the defendant’s ‘active deception’ regarding her gender identity. 
That is, McNally had presented as male, while the court found her to be female. In 
addition to her male gender performance, the court found active deception to reside 
in, among other things, a series of statements she made to the complainant, mainly 
concerned with what she wanted to do to the complainant sexually and how she imag-
ined their future together. The court’s finding of deception presupposes lack of 
                                                 
1
 R v Barker [2012] Guildford Crown Court, unrep; R v Wilson [2013] Edinburgh High Court, unrep; R 
v McNally [2013] EWCA Crim 1051; R v Newland [2015] Chester Crown Court, unrep; R v Lee (Ma-
son) [2015] Lincoln Crown Court, unrep; R v Staines [2016] Bristol Crown Court, unrep. All defend-
ants, except Wilson and Lee (Mason), received custodial sentences and all were placed on sex offend-
ers registers. 
2
 McNally op. cit., n 1.  
3
 McNally op. cit., n 1 at para 3. 
4
 McNally op. cit., n 1 at para 10.  
5
 s. 2 Sexual Offences Act 2003.  
6
 On appeal, the sentence was reduced to 9 months suspended for 2 years (McNally op. cit., n 1 para 2). 
2 
knowledge on the part of the complainant regarding the defendant’s gender history. 
This finding that the complainant believed the defendant to be a cisgender man, 
proved possible despite the parties spending considerable time together and engaging 
in penetrative sex on multiple occasions, and despite the fact that the defendant has 
breasts, a voice within the female range, and has not benefited from the masculinising 
effects of male hormones. It is curious that the Crown Prosecution Service, the trial 
judge and the Court of Appeal all appeared to accept so readily a claim so apparently 
antithetical to common sense. These issues, and the Court of Appeal’s interpretation 
of the facts, will be considered in detail in the counter-judgment.  
 
The parties in McNally might be described as a cisgender
7
 female complainant and a 
transgender man respectively. However, there is uncertainty regarding the precise na-
ture of the defendant’s gender identity, a fact that served to undermine the efforts of 
McNally’s counsel before the Court of Appeal. Whether Justine McNally is 
transgender is perhaps a moot point. She is certainly a gender non-conforming person. 
However, there was evidence to suggest that she believed herself to be a transgender 
man at the time of sexual intimacy with the complainant, albeit she asserted a female 
gender identity at the time of plea and subsequent appeal. It is because of this latter 
fact that female pronouns will be used throughout this article. Nevertheless, the au-
thenticity of McNally’s assertion of a male gender identity, prior to and at the time of 
sexual intimacy between the parties, goes to the heart of the case because it is at this 
time, and not subsequently, when criminal liability arises 
 
SEXUAL FRAUD LAW 
Since the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, which, informed by feminist 
advocacy and the Setting the Boundaries Report, placed greater emphasis on the com-
plainant’s right to sexual autonomy8 we have witnessed an expansion of the law per-
taining to sexual fraud. While this might be viewed as consistent with the aim of 
achieving substantive equality for cisgender women, it appears to have had the oppo-
site effect for transgender and other gender non-conforming defendants. Prior to this 
legislation, prosecutions for sexual fraud were essentially limited to two particular 
types of circumstance, ones long-recognised at common law, namely fraud in the fac-
tum and fraud in the inducement. The former refers to scenarios where the fraud went 
to the sexual act itself and appears to have been confined to a handful of cases involv-
ing naive young women who were apparently unaware they were engaging in sexual 
intercourse due to some false representation made by the defendant
9
 or who had been 
deceived into believing it was a medical procedure.
10
 The latter referred to the scenar-
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io where a male defendant had sex with a woman through deceiving her into believing 
he was her husband.
11
  
Prior to 2003, these categories exhausted the possibility of prosecuting sexual offenc-
es on the basis of fraud. Beyond these categories, fraud was considered consistent 
with consent, a matter going only to surrounding circumstances or to an attribute of 
the defendant.
12
 The legislation placed both these types of fraud on a statutory footing 
as conclusive presumptions. Fraud in the factum was expanded to include fraud as to 
the ‘purpose’ as well as the ‘nature’ of the sexual act,13 and fraud in the inducement 
became uncoupled from its prior gendered and marital restrictions.
14
 However, and 
despite some academic emphasis on the wider scope for criminalisation offered by s. 
76(2)(a),
15
 the courts have generally
16
 avoided relying on provisions which remove a 
defence of reasonable belief, preferring instead to expand the law through the general 
consent provision found in s. 74.
17
  
In expanding liability under s. 74, the courts have, through a series of cases, estab-
lished a distinction between non-disclosure of information and active deception.
18
 
Thus, in addition to a normative finding that fraud relates to a ‘material’ fact, for the 
courts have long viewed numerous deceptions to be too trivial to vitiate consent,
19
 it 
would appear that ‘a certain degree of knowledge or intentionality has been injected 
into s. 74.’20 In McNally, the Court of Appeal found deception as to gender identity to 
be deception as to a ‘material’ fact and located McNally on the active side of the 
act/omission distinction. In relation to mens rea, it was established that, in addition to 
being actively deceptive, McNally lacked a reasonable belief in consent.
21
 These find-
ings will be addressed in the counter-judgment, as will the court’s choice not to dis-
tinguish the McNally facts from those of existing authorities. 
THE VALUE OF COUNTER-JUDGMENT WRITING 
While the judgment to be offered is more properly described as queer, and while its 
aim is to queer or trouble R v McNally, it shares much with the approach taken by 
feminist legal scholars who have attempted to imagine, and express in judgment form, 
what a judgment might look like if it were animated by a desire to achieve substantive 
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equality, overcome gender bias, privilege context over abstraction, avoid (at least 
non-strategic kinds of) essentialism and further other feminist principles.
22
 In a simi-
lar fashion, the counter-judgment to be offered, a kind of queer missing voice, will 
constitute an act of ethical reimagination, one that aims to centre-stage the experienc-
es and perspectives of gender non-conforming people, accommodate their differences 
and address their historical disadvantage. As Erika Rackley has put it, such judgments 
aim to ‘challenge the majority’s story and weaken its hold on our collective imagina-
tion.’23  
Writing a queer or feminist judgment, or indeed a judgment informed by some other 
set of alternative ethical principles, involves the writer in ‘a kind of hybrid form of 
critique and law reform project.’24 As Rosemary Hunter observes, engaging in such a 
task is ‘not done simply as an academic exercise or for an academic audience.’25 Ra-
ther, the aim is to have the counter-judgment ‘taken seriously,’ to influence activists, 
lawyers and judges, and therefore, if indirectly, ‘to change the law or at least to con-
tribute to its development.’26 More specifically, the aim is to demonstrate that, at the 
time a case was decided, it could, and should, have been decided differently.  
Of course, in adopting legal judgment-writing as a particular form of praxis, legal 
form or legal method go essentially unchallenged.
27
 From feminist or queer perspec-
tives this obviously raises some difficulties, ones which I will address below. Howev-
er, for present purposes, it is important to emphasise that in order for counter-
judgment to be taken seriously and therefore have legal and political purchase, exter-
nal critique must be circumscribed. While weaving external critique into counter-
judgment is essential if the exercise is not to become pointless, the degree and extent 
to which this can be done must be limited by fidelity to precedent, to judicial custom 
and to the practices of judges in the English appellate courts.  
Thus, the re-writing of R v McNally will be a constrained exercise. That is, the coun-
ter-judgment offered will be one that might actually have been written while remain-
ing faithful to existing legal principles, including the need not to go beyond the issues 
actually raised in the case.
28
 It will stretch legal principle, but only within the confines 
of its own elasticity. In this respect, counter-judgment ‘remind[s] us that law is a pro-
cess of decisions, actions, choices, relationships and values, and not simply a set of 
abstract or hypostatised doctrines.’29 In the present instance, it opens up new possi-
bilities for queer advocacy and intervention. It promises to write gender non-
conforming people into law as intelligible subjects.  
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Another benefit that judgment-writing offers ‘lies in the discipline of putting one’s 
theoretical insights into judgment form.’30 This not only serves to convey the practi-
cality of theoretical arguments, it also ‘works to validate and give authority to the ar-
guments deployed in reaching the alternative decision.’31 As Erika Rackley notes, an 
academic argument may be seen ‘as stronger, or more persuasive, for being presented 
in judgment form.’32 This is because a legal judgment ‘must, without exception, not 
only come to a conclusion but also in the process leave “no room for doubt, and no 
room for argument, about what has been decided and why.”’33 Of course, this ‘defini-
tive moment’ is confined to an immediate set of facts. It remains subject to possible 
appeals and the revisiting of the relevant legal issues by appellate courts in the future. 
Moreover, and importantly, in order to be properly effective, a judgment should be ‘a 
combination of judicial rhetoric and persuasion which ensures that the reader arrives 
at the same conclusion as the judge.’34 Judicial rhetoric, narrative style and tone are 
important as techniques of persuasion, as means of establishing affective relations be-
tween judge and reader. They are matters to which the counter-judgment will pay at-
tention. Judges clearly have different writing styles ranging from the technical to lucid 
prose. It is important however, especially when writing with the marginal in mind, to 
write in a style that draws on the reader’s sense of pathos and empathy, that is, in a 
style that strikes an emotional chord. As Benjamin Cardozo recognised long ago, a 
judgment ‘need[s] persuasive force, or the impressive virtue of sincerity and fire, or 
the mnemonic power of alliteration and antithesis, or the terseness of proverb and the 
maxim. Neglect these allies, and it may never win its way.’35 Whether judges always 
recognise the significance of these features, one or more of them are often present, 
demonstrating the importance of, amongst other things, the relationship between cul-
tural imagery and judicial rule choice.
36
 They can be deployed in ways which either 
further or hinder progressive social change.  
Returning to the theme of fidelity to the law, it is noted that judicial judgment-writing 
often, and increasingly, draws on context and extraneous material. This might appear 
to conflict with the earlier observation that appellate courts should confine themselves 
to matters raised by the parties at trial or before them on appeal, and should not con-
sider matters upon which the parties have not had an opportunity to comment.
37
 How-
ever, a judge can introduce material of her own motion. To do so, she must rely on the 
doctrine of ‘judicial notice.’ This doctrine permits judges to have regard to ‘matters 
which are so notorious, or clearly established, or susceptible to demonstration by ref-
erence to a readily obtainable and authoritative source, that evidence of their existence 
is unnecessary.’38 Judicial notice may also be taken of principles of international law 
and courts are bound to have regard to European human rights law. Moreover, ‘it is 
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also permissible for a judge to make inquiries and consult sources “to which it is 
proper to … refer.”’39 It is unclear how wide such an ambit might be, though it cer-
tainly appears to cover ‘sources which are publicly available, reasonably widely 
known, and unlikely to be the subject of serious dispute.’40 Accordingly, it would, for 
example, be appropriate for a judge to refer to well-documented patterns of discrimi-
nation and violence experienced by transgender and other gender non-conforming 
people
41
 and to exceptionally high rates of suicide within transgender communities.
42
  
Finally, judgment-writing responds, in one particular way, to the criticism that femi-
nist, queer and other critical legal scholars are removed from the struggles of margin-
alised communities, and to the charge, or at least the perception, of irrelevance.
43
 Of 
course, in taking up judgment-writing as a form of resistance to heteronormativity and 
cisnormativity,
44
 it is not pretended that the authority acquired in doing so is that of an 
appellate court judge. Obviously, academic judgment-writing does not operate in the 
same ‘field of pain and death’45 as that of the judiciary. Its power therefore ‘lies not in 
its manifestation of authority,’46 but in its demonstration of the contingency in the 
way that judges arrive at judgment and in ‘the degree to which the [academic] judge is 
able to push the boundaries of legal convention.’47 Ultimately however, value lies in 
offering a more ethically palatable solution to the controversy at hand and emphasis-
ing not only the fact that a case could have been decided differently, but that it ought 
to have been decided differently.  
A QUEER APPROACH 
In approaching legal judgment-writing from a queer theory perspective it is necessary 
to confront the charge that such an endeavour, as an engagment with law, is distinctly 
unqueer. As Fineman et al note, queer legal theory is ‘something of a paradox given 
the tension between “queer” and “legal.”’48 This is a matter I will turn to shortly. 
First, however, it is important to outline the approach to be taken. A queer approach 
assumes that judgment-writing is guided by what might be described as an important 
set of queer principles. These include, challenging dominant and binary understand-
ings of the categories of sex, gender and sexuality, deconstructing ideas of normalcy 
and deviance, defending desire,
49
 and placing at the centre of analysis and critique, 
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those located at the sexual and gender margins. The queer approach is indebted to 
postmodern philosophical approaches to notions of power, knowledge and the subject, 
and especially the writings of Michel Foucault,
50
 as well as to sociological theories 
that also foreground social constructionism in accounting for identity categories.
51
 It 
deploys these various theories, and insights that might be derived from them, specifi-
cally on the terrain of gender and sexuality.  
In terms of an explicitly queer theoretical approach, it can perhaps be dated to the 
writings of Judith Butler
52
 and Eve Sedgwick,
53
 though a queer corpus has expanded 
considerably since.
54
 The approach has also been taken up within legal scholarship.
55
 
A queer approach is of particular value in the present instance, because the counter-
judgment to be written is one that must deal with a set of facts where questions of sex, 
gender and sexual identity lie at the heart of any legal resolution. That is, Justine 
McNally’s personal story crosses sexual and gender lines. It does so in the sense that 
she ‘performed’ straight masculinity.  
However, we need to be careful here. First, it must be acknowledged that, while queer 
theory and trans theory overlap significantly,
56
 and while one can be both transgender 
and queer, there are tensions existing across this theoretical and political divide. In 
particular, there has been resistance to queer theory’s emphasis on gender ‘perfor-
mance’ and its frequent failure to take the materiality of the body, seriously. Thus, Jay 
Prosser, has argued that queer theory ‘[elides] the experience of “trans” embodi-
ment,’57 the way in which ‘[t]he body is crucially and materially formative of the 
self.’58 This problem is perhaps especially troublesome given that queer has tended to 
take trans to be emblematic of its theoretical position. As Prosser has put it, in his cri-
tique of Judith Butler’s Gender Trouble,59 trans has been presented ‘as the concrete 
example’ of the ‘performativity of gender.’60  
However, my focus in re-writing McNally remains queer for two related reasons. 
First, not all of the gender non-conforming defendants in the gender identity fraud 
cases identify as transgender and, in the case of Justine McNally, as already noted, 
she later countermanded her earlier male gender identification. It should also be noted 
that in relation to those who do, none had commenced hormones or undertaken any 
somatic changes prior to the time of the alleged offences. Second, and, more im-
portantly, especially in the context of criminal prosecution and sanction, it is desirable 
to approach judgment in a way which does not diminish or render inauthentic the ex-
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periences of gender non-conforming people, irrespective of whether they identify as 
transgender or not.  
In thinking of gender as performative in the Butlerian sense, that is, as ‘a reiteration of 
a norm or a set of norms’ which conceal ‘the conventions of which it is a repetition,’61 
the notion of a deceptive performance immediately becomes problematic. After all, 
how can there be fraud if represented gender has no ontological referent? However, 
while we all perform gender, some performances are more likely to be read as artifi-
cial or as drag in contradistinction to the ‘natural’ genders of others, for whom they 
act as mirror or ontological prop. This is, of course, given dominant ideologies of het-
eronormativity and cisnormativity, more likely for those who perform their genders at 
odds with birth-designated scripts. This issue is important because a claim of gender 
deception goes to the heart of the prosecution case and tends to reinforce the notion 
that while gender movement can be legally recognised (at least in the case of some 
transgender people),
62
 gender ‘authenticity’ depends on, if not total stasis, then a one-
off relocation within a binary gender system. This raises difficulties for many of the 
defendants in the gender identity fraud cases prosecuted. In relation to McNally, any 
attempt to overcome a hegemonic reading of gender, and therefore gender deception, 
becomes immediately complicated by the fact that Justine, having initially identified 
as male, subsequently asserted a female gender identity from the time of plea. In writ-
ing a counter-judgment, I will, though constrained by the nature of the judicial exer-
cise, attempt to render legible the complexity, variance and fluidity of this category 
we call gender identity.  
I now turn to addressing the concerns of those who would refuse a queer/law nexus. 
In trying to stage an encounter between queer and law, and perhaps especially so in 
the context of legal judgment-writing where, as already noted, one necessarily pro-
ceeds into the fray with one hand tied behind one’s back, such are the demands of the 
legal exercise, it is understandable that some queer, feminist and other critical legal 
scholars might adopt a position of scepticism. Nor is such scepticism an idle affair. 
The danger that law will reproduce, and thereby entrench, the very problem to which 
queer theory is now offered as partial solution, or at least strategic intervention, is 
acknowledged. It is, of course, a danger emphasised long ago by Carol Smart in the 
context of feminist engagements with law.
63
 As she put it, law cannot ‘provide the 
solution to the oppression that it celebrates and sustains.’64 Certainly, an encounter 
with law is always a risk or wager. This is true both in the sense of adverse instrumen-
tal outcomes and in terms of law’s representation of those at the sexual and gender 
margins. Ultimately, for Smart, law’s power to construct ‘truth’ and the consequent 
power-effects of its ‘truth’ claims, make law a risk not worth taking.  
This suspicion of law is one many queer legal scholars share. Yet, as Zanghellini ar-
gues, queer legal theoretical scholarship must transcend a preoccupation with the 
‘conceptual’ at the expense of the ‘normative’ in mapping out jurisprudential space.65 
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As he explains, while counter-normativity, ‘the repudiation of dominant norms,’ is 
important, it should not succumb to antinormativity, which would commit us to a ‘re-
nunciation of prescriptive projects.’66 Rather, ‘the primary motor of queer incursions 
into conceptual jurisprudential ground … must be political in nature - in the sense of 
its connection with a concern for justice for sex and gender outsiders.’67 While some 
might view such an approach to be anything but queer, it remains a truism to say that 
it is ‘the normative commitments from which they proceed’ that make queer critiques 
‘ultimately worthwhile.’68  
Thus, while it is important to chart disciplinary power and its normalising effects, it is 
equally, if not more, important to recognise how they ‘constrain personal autonomy’69 
and counter diversity. Moreover, and importantly, despite queer’s anti-humanist rhet-
oric, one tends to find, as Zanghellini contends, ‘a general commitment to liberal hu-
manist values … such as ideas of respect, value pluralism and personal autonomy.’70 
Thus, while queer, influenced by poststructural thought as it is, conceives of the con-
cepts of power, epistemology and ontology and their interelationship, differently than 
liberalism, broader values of tolerance, pluralism and respect for agency (a queer and 
feminist version of liberal autonomy), belie some common and worthwhile ground. 
Moreover, as Sandland notes, deconstruction and law reform are not mutually exclu-
sive, that is, the latter might be accomplished by the former.
71
 Ultimately, ‘[t]he ques-
tion of whether some forms of resistance are more effective than others is a matter of 
social and historical investigation and not of a priori theoretical pronouncement.’72  
What we must do however, in approaching law from a queer perspective, is ‘be pre-
pared to consider our evaluative and prescriptive analysis potentially provisional and 
always capable of being revised or superseded.’73 While judgment-writing requires 
finality, at least in relation to present facts, subject to appeal, it is important to con-
struct a judgment, to the maximum extent possible, in such a way that sexual and 
gender futures are not foreclosed. I do not pretend this to be an easy task. And, no 
doubt, any attempt at judgment-writing will fall short of this ideal. Ultimately, while 
justice is a concept which is perhaps unattainable in any pure sense, we ought never-
theless to move toward it, towards its horizon. Moreover, if queer (or feminism) re-
nunciate judgment, then the space of judgment will continue to be monopolised by the 
judiciary and therefore is likely to be animated by hegemonic discourses. The judg-
ment that follows will attempt to write into legal existence transgender and other gen-
der non-conforming people in a manner that qualifies their knowledge and experience 
as legitimate.  
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SHARPE J.    
Introduction 
1. I have had the benefit of reading in draft the judgment of Leveson LJ. However, I 
reach an entirely different conclusion based on my reading of the facts. As Oscar 
Wilde observed, ‘[t]he truth is rarely pure and never simple’ (The Importance of Be-
ing Earnest, Act I). This certainly seems to be true in this case, in which young love 
appears to have gone awry.  
2. On the 4 December 2012, the defendant was convicted of six counts of assault by 
penetration contrary to s. 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, and on 21 March 2013, 
was sentenced to three years in a young offender institution. In relation to sentence, 
Leveson LJ recommends reducing the sentence to a term of 9 months, suspended for 
two years, together with a suspended sentence supervision order. While sentence re-
duction is, in my view, to be welcomed, I do not intend otherwise to address the ques-
tion of sentence because I consider the conviction to be unsafe for reasons I shall de-
tail.  
3. It appears from the evidence that the complainant was significantly and detrimen-
tally affected by discovering that the object of her affections, whom she apparently 
believed to be a boy, was in fact a girl. It was precisely this discrepancy, and the ‘de-
ception’ implicit therein, that led the trial judge, His Honour Judge Patrick, to consid-
er that the elements of the offence were made out. In his judgment, Leveson LJ rightly 
pointed out that if, on any version of the facts, the elements of the offence were not 
made out, the appellant’s conviction would undeniably be unsafe and would fall to be 
quashed even though she had pleaded guilty (see R v McReady and Hurd [1978] 1 
WLR 1376). I state from the outset that I am not satisfied the Crown discharged this 
burden on the basis of the facts presented. My concerns relate both to the actus reus 
and mens rea elements of the offences prosecuted, though I shall base my conclusions 
on a failure to establish the latter under current law.  
4. It is important also to emphasise the vulnerability and marginality of the appellant 
as a gender non-conforming person, considerations which, in my view, received in-
sufficient attention before the trial judge and Leveson LJ in their treatment of the is-
sues. In particular, there appear to be considerable dangers associated with ‘coming 
out’ as transgender in our society. These include high rates of violence, discrimination 
and suicide (see Whittle, S, et al, The Equalities Review: Engendered Penalties: 
Transgender and Transsexual People’s Experiences of Inequality & Discrimination, 
2007). I do not draw my conclusions on the basis of these observations, though they 
do provide some colour and context to the general approach I adopt. 
The facts of the case 
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5. The facts of the case are detailed by Leveson LJ and can be summarised here, 
though whether they are ‘undeniably unusual,’ as he contends, is perhaps more 
properly an empirical question. In this respect, I note only that dating, and other forms 
of social interaction, are increasingly occurring through the internet, and that this is 
perhaps especially true for young people. Another difficulty with viewing the facts as 
‘unusual’ is that it presumes young people struggling with gender identity to be few in 
number and secrecy or reticence concerning disclosure of their birth-designated gen-
der to be unjustifiable. It appears to me that the first presumption has, in recent years, 
been shown to be demonstrably false. Indeed, a study by the Gender Identity Research 
and Education Society has put the UK transgender population at 300,000 (B. Reed et 
al, Gender Variance in the UK: Prevalence, Incidence, Growth and Geographic Dis-
tribution, 2009, p. 13). In relation to the second presumption, it is important to reiter-
ate the serious problem of prejudice faced by transgender and other gender non-
conforming people in our society, a problem, sadly, that only a cursory acquaintance 
with our daily newspapers attests.  
6. Turning to the facts, the appellant, who lives in Scotland, met the complainant, who 
lives in London, on the internet through the social networking game, ‘Habbo.’ She 
used the male name ‘Scott’ for the purposes of her online presence. At the time of 
first meeting, the appellant was aged 13 years, while the complainant was a year 
younger, aged 12-13 (there appears to be uncertainty on this point). In using female 
pronouns in referring to the appellant, I am simply respecting her assertion of a fe-
male gender identity at the time of plea and subsequently. For reasons I will make 
clear however, this does not serve to preclude the alternative legal conclusion that I 
have arrived at regarding the claim of deception.   
7. The internet relationship developed over the following three and half years with the 
parties considering themselves boyfriend and girlfriend. They communicated, mainly 
by the online messenger service, MSN, and spoke of getting married and having chil-
dren. They also communicated by mobile phone and the complainant saw the appel-
lant as ‘Scott’ on a web cam. As the couple moved further into adolescence, their in-
terest in one another became increasingly sexual and they settled on an exclusive ro-
mantic relationship. They engaged in phone sex and spoke of what they wanted to do 
to each other sexually. Shortly after the complainant’s 16th birthday in March 2011 
the parties met in London at the complainant’s home. The appellant, who by this time 
was aged 17 years, presented as a boy. Under her trousers, she wore a penile prosthe-
sis. In the months that followed, the appellant visited the complainant on four subse-
quent occasions.  
8. On the second visit, they watched a movie together and they kissed. They then 
went to the complainant’s bedroom. In the dark, the appellant rubbed the complain-
ant’s vagina with her fingers and performed cunnilingus. The complainant then went 
to get condoms which she purchased for the purpose of sexual intercourse. The appel-
lant remained dressed and refused the complainant’s offer to perform fellatio. On the 
third visit the appellant orally and digitally penetrated the complainant on multiple 
occasions. On the fourth visit the parties spoke about having sex but did not do so, 
partly because they were experiencing some relationship difficulties. On the final visit 
in November 2011, the complainant’s mother confronted the appellant and insisted 
‘Scott’ was really a girl. At this point, according to her own evidence, the complainant 
felt devastated and physically sick after having being ‘lied’ to for four years. At this 
stage, the appellant spoke of a desire to undergo gender reassignment surgery. This 
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latter piece of evidence was, in my view, not given proper regard or weight in consid-
ering the broader issues.  
9. After this final visit the relationship ended, though there was some limited commu-
nication between the parties thereafter. The complainant’s mother made a complaint 
to the appellant’s school and the police became involved after she admitted to her 
head teacher that sexual acts had taken place. On 30 November 2011, the complainant 
made a full statement to the police detailing the alleged offences. While some of her 
answers were perhaps equivocal, the substance of her statement was essentially that 
she viewed herself as heterosexual, and had only consented to sexual acts with ‘Scott’ 
because she believed the appellant to be a boy.  
10. For her part, the appellant offered the following account to the police by way of a 
prepared statement. She met the complainant through the internet using the avatar 
‘Scott.’ She claims to have done so because she felt more comfortable presenting as 
male. She also claimed that as early as December 2009, the complainant discovered or 
at least suspected that she had been designated female at birth, and that this led to an 
argument. According to the appellant they started speaking to each other again after 
this point and the relationship continued. In his judgment, Leveson LJ expressed the 
view that the claim that the complainant knew or had suspicions regarding the appel-
lant’s birth-designated gender was inconsistent with the evidence presented.  
11. He did so, not because of its later retraction and the appellant’s subsequent guilty 
plea, but because he appears to have interpreted two pieces of evidence as pointing to 
only one conclusion. Thus he expressed the view that the appellant’s claim regarding 
complainant knowledge or suspicion was incompatible with the alleged argument, and 
with the complainant’s subsequent purchase of condoms at the time of the second vis-
it. I do not share Leveson LJ’s view that complainant knowledge or suspicion is nec-
essarily or logically inconsistent with the occurence of an argument or indeed the 
complainant’s purchase of condoms. I will provide reasons for so concluding but at 
this stage simply note the existence of alternative interpretations that are open on the 
evidence, ones which raise difficulties for the view that the appellant necessarily acted 
deceptively. 
Grounds of appeal 
12. Counsel for the appellant raised three grounds of appeal against conviction: (1) 
the appellant’s legal advisors failed to advise her correctly on matters which went to 
the heart of her plea because (2) the elements of the offence were not made out and 
the appellant could not have been convicted with the result that (3) the appellant’s 
plea was equivocal. In his judgment, Leveson LJ has dealt in detail with each of these 
interrelated grounds of appeal. I propose to focus on (2), which if correct, as counsel 
for the appellant asserts, leads logically to (3). In my view, and on the basis of the ev-
idence, I do not think it can be said that the elements of the offence were made out. 
For this reason I agree with counsel’s claim that the appellant’s plea was equivocal. I 
also note in this regard, that the appellant stated before this court that, at the time of 
signing witness statements, she ‘just wanted it to be over.’  
13. However, before turning to consider the second ground of appeal, I will address 
the first ground and to that extent proceed in the same manner as Leveson LJ. How-
ever, unlike Leveson LJ, I would uphold this ground of appeal. My reasons are specif-
ic, but linked to the more substantive objection raised by counsel under the second 
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ground. In the first place, Mr Thomas, the appellant’s barrister prior to appeal, while 
insisting that he did not tell the appellant she had no defence and that she should plead 
guilty, made the following statement before this court: ‘In view of [the appellant’s] 
replies I was satisfied in my own mind she (and her parents) knew all the constituent 
elements of the offence and that these were made out’ (my emphasis).  
14. In my view, and for reasons to be provided in my consideration of the second 
ground of appeal, it is not at all clear on the basis of the evidence that the prosecution 
case was made out. Further, Mr Thomas appears to have drawn the same conclusion 
as Leveson LJ regarding the significance of the complainant’s purchase of condoms, 
and in terms emphasising the difficulty of the appellant’s position. He also stated that 
the versions of events provided by the complainant and appellant ‘could not live in 
the same world,’ a claim I consider to be over-blown, at least in some respects and, 
more importantly, that ‘it would be clear to the jury who was telling the truth.’ While 
the appellant may have lied about some matters, and although her case possesses 
some obvious evidential weaknesses, the difficulty I have with the legal advice she 
received lies in the fact that it failed, in my opinion, to recognise that the appellant 
may have had a good defence had the central issue of her gender identity at the time 
of legal liability been properly addressed.  
15. Indeed, one of the central difficulties of this case is the fact that several pieces of 
evidence used to support a conclusion of deception are also entirely consistent with 
the view that the appellant actually believed herself to be male at the time of the al-
leged offences. This possibility appears to have been discounted because of the fact 
that the appellant subsequently, that is, at the time of plea and this present appeal, as-
serted a female gender identity. In other words, the question becomes: must gender 
identity be static in order to be authentic? In my view, it is the assumption that it must 
that goes to the heart of this case. It is perhaps the elephant in the room and, in my 
view, failure to recognise it as such places gender non-conforming people at great 
peril within our criminal justice system. I now turn to the second ground and therefore 
to the substance of this appeal, where I will flesh out some of the concerns to which I 
have alluded.  
The substantive legal issues 
16. Counsel’s second ground of appeal is that the elements of the offence were not 
made out. In relation to the offence of assault by penetration, three things must be 
proved: (i) sexual penetration occurred (ii) the complainant did not consent, and (iii) 
the appellant possessed the necessary mens rea. In this case (i) is an agreed fact. It is 
(ii) and (iii) to which I shall devote attention, and consideration of (iii) upon which I 
shall base my judgment. However, before proceeding further, it is necessary to recog-
nise that in relation to proving mens rea it is not sufficient for the Crown to establish 
only that the appellant lacked a reasonable belief in consent. This is because the pre-
sent case involves not a claim of coercive sex, but deceptive sex. In relation to the lat-
ter, the Court of Appeal has made clear that there is no obligation to disclose personal 
information, even in circumstances where a defendant is aware that a complainant 
would not consent to sexual intimacy if she knew this information. Rather, the mens 
rea for sexual fraud is to be established by proof also of some form of ‘active decep-
tion’ (see R v EB [2006] EWCA Crim 2945, Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authori-
ty [2011] EWHC  2849 (Admin), R v Bingham [2013] EWCA Crim 823, R (on the 
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application of F) v DPP [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin)). In my view, this is the central 
issue and difficulty for the prosecution.  
17. Unfortunately, the matter is more complicated still because the Court of Appeal in 
earlier decisions, and Leveson L.J. in this case, have muddied the waters of actus reus 
and mens rea. Thus, the notion of ‘active deception,’ while clearly an element of mens 
rea, also appears to have been imported into the actus reus element of non-consent so 
that consent, amongst other things, turns on whether deception is considered to be of 
an active kind. In my view, this development of criminal law doctrine is regrettable 
and is reminiscent of the ‘wrong turn’ taken by the House of Lords in R v Morris 
[1984] AC 320 (HL) (dicta of Lord Roskill not applied in R v Gomez [1993] AC 442 
(HL); R v Hinks [2001] 2 AC 241 (HL)). In my view, proof of actus reus and mens 
rea elements should be kept analytically separate. That is, whether a defendant delib-
erately deceived the complainant and whether he did so in an active manner ought to 
be matters considered only in the context of establishing mens rea. However, if proof 
of non-consent now requires proof of active deception, which the authorities suggest 
it does, then my conclusion that active deception is not made out would also mean 
that there has been a failure to establish non-consent. Before turning to the mens rea, 
where I will consider the concept of active deception and its application to the facts, I 
will first consider the actus reus element of non-consent where, for the reasons al-
ready stated, I will chart the emergence of a distinction between non-disclosure of in-
formation and active deception. 
Non-consent 
18. This case appears to be one in which two young people who had reached the age 
of consent participated in desire-led intimacy on multiple occasions. The claim that 
consent was absent is based on s. 74 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 which provides 
that: 
For the purposes of this Part, a person consents if he agrees by 
choice and has the freedom and capacity to make that choice. 
It was made clear by the Crown that the evidential presumptions to be found in s. 75 
are not relevant on the facts and that the conclusive presumptions in s. 76 are not re-
lied on. While intentional fraud as to ‘the nature and purpose of the sexual act’ might 
be considered relevant under s. 76(2)(a), the Court of Appeal has proved extremely 
reluctant to find consent absent on this basis (in particular see, R v EB [2006] EWCA 
Crim 2945, R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA Crim 1699, R v Bingham [2013] EWCA Crim 
823, R (on the application of F) v DPP [2013] EWHC 945 (Admin)), though it has 
done so on occasion (R v Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527, though in R v Bingham, 
judicial notice was taken of academic criticism of the case (para 14)). This general 
reluctance is due to what the presumption conclusively concludes in addition to an 
absence of consent, namely, ‘that the defendant did not reasonably believe that the 
complainant consented to the relevant act.’ This is an approach I wholly endorse.  
19. In cases of sexual fraud, it is clear that a finding of non-consent under s. 74 pre-
supposes that deception pertains to a fact that is considered legally material. The 
courts have long considered some deceptions to be so trivial that consent is deemed 
valid. In his judgment, Leveson LJ offers the example of deception as to wealth, and 
notes that this ‘will obviously not be sufficient to vitiate consent.’ Accordingly, the 
courts have taken the view that sexual autonomy, while an important right, is not an 
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unlimited one, at least not in fraud contexts. Thus, the language of s. 74 and, in par-
ticular, the words ‘choice’ and freedom,’ are not understood in some philosophically 
pure sense, but rather as circumscribed in normative terms, or as Lord Judge CJ put it 
in R (on the application of F) v DPP [2013] EWCA 945 (Admin), they ‘must be ap-
proached in a broad commonsense way’ (26). In contexts of desire-led, as opposed to 
coerced intimacy, it is clearly important to set limits to the reach of the criminal law, 
lest it become uncoupled from the community in which it is to take root. Such an ap-
proach not only accords with basic liberal principles, but also with the need to recog-
nise the special vulnerability of some individuals in our society due to widespread 
predjudice and discrimination. The present case, dealing with a young gender non-
conforming person as it does, is a case in point. While I have every sympathy for the 
complainant in this case, and for other women in her position, there are other interests 
at stake, as well as important public policy considerations that must be taken into ac-
count.  
20. In saying this, I do not mean to suggest, as a matter of law, that deception as to 
gender be considered a trivial affair. In this respect, I stop short of endorsing counsel 
for the appellant’s contention to that effect. As Leveson LJ stated, ‘depending on the 
circumstances, deception as to gender can vitiate consent.’ While it is unclear from 
his judgment which kinds of deceptions as to gender would vitiate consent and which 
would not, I accept that if a defendant, prior to intimacy, deliberately deceived a com-
plainant about his gender identity, knowing that gender status was fundamental to her 
consent, then consent would be invalid. At some point in the future, being a man or 
woman might cease to possess such importance. If so, deception as to gender identity 
might be more readily analogised to Leveson LJ’s example of fraud concerning 
wealth. For the present however, the view that being a man or woman is important in 
sexual contexts is one which accords with community sentiment. However, while 
Leveson LJ appears to leave the matter open, I do not consider facts about gender to 
be legally material beyond the immediate fact of gender identity. To treat them as 
such would be to imbue transgender people’s bodies and histories with legal signifi-
cance. It might be argued that all sorts of facts relating to gender are material, includ-
ing chromosomes, past and present genital status, legal gender status and gender so-
cialisation experience. However, to my mind, a line in the sand must be drawn be-
tween gender identity and such other matters. Failure to do so would, in effect, be to 
confer on a non-transgender person a right to determine a transgender person’s gender 
identity. It would also come perilously close to subverting the very act/omission dis-
tinction on which the Court of Appeal has founded liability.  
21. In the present case, the view that consent is lacking is based on the claim that the 
complainant was unaware of the appellant’s ‘true’ gender identity and that this was 
due to active deception perpetrated by the appellant. That is, the complainant claimed 
that she believed the appellant to be the boy, ‘Scott,’ the appellant had represented 
herself to be. This question of representation is one I will address in some detail when 
considering mens rea. However, I express reservation concerning the apparent ease 
with which the Crown Prosecution Service, prosecuting counsel and His Honour 
Judge Patrick accepted that the actus reus element of non-consent was met.  
22. The concern I have here pertains to the way in which the complainant’s claim of 
ignorance regarding the appellant’s birth-designated gender resonated so easily de-
spite the following facts: the parties spent considerable time in each other’s company; 
had penetrative sex on multiple occasions; the appellant has breasts, a voice within 
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the female range and presumably skin softer to the touch than a man’s; and although 
expressing a desire for gender reassignment surgery (a point to which I shall return), 
the appellant had not benefited from the masculinising effects of male hormones. In 
other words, accepting the complainant’s account, not something a jury were called 
on to do, seems to require, to quote one of England’s great poets, Samuel Taylor Co-
leridge, that we ‘suspend our disbelief’ (Biographia Literaria, 1817, chp xiv), and in 
my view, to a quite extraordinary degree.  
23. I also note that the Crown Prosecution Service’s Code for Prosecutors requires 
prosecutors to ‘consider whether there are any reasons to question the reliability of the 
evidence, including its accuracy or integrity’ and ‘whether there are any reasons to 
doubt the credibility of the evidence’ (para 4.6). Further, the Code states that a case 
that does not meet these tests ‘must not proceed, no matter how serious or sensitive it 
may be’ (para 4.4) (my emphasis). I would encourage the Crown Prosecution Service 
to look again at the Code and especially in relation to transgender and other gender 
non-conforming suspects.  
24. Having expressed these reservations, I now turn to providing a summary of rele-
vant case law decided under s. 74. For reasons already given, this will entail reference 
to the concept of active deception. In considering the scope of this legal concept, I 
will suggest that existing authorities might be distinguished from the present facts. 
The interpretation of s. 74, as it applies to sexual fraud, as opposed to sexual coercion, 
has been considered in a series of cases beginning with R v EB [2006] EWCA Crim 
2945. In this case, counsel for the prosecution suggested that a failure to disclose HIV 
positive status prior to sexual intercourse served to vitiate consent. The suggestion 
was roundly rejected by the Court of Appeal. While consent would be vitiated in such 
circumstances in relation to charges brought under the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861, Latham LJ insisted that non-disclosure of HIV positive status was ‘not rel-
evant to the issue of consent under s. 74.’  
25. In the later case of Assange v Swedish Prosecution Authority [2011] EWHC  2849 
(Admin), the Divisional Court emphasised that EB ‘goes no further than deciding that 
a failure to disclose HIV infection is not of itself a relevant consideration under s. 74’ 
(my emphasis). In other words, the court left open the possibility that, for example, 
lying about HIV status might be a relevant consideration. In hearing the extradition 
case brought against Julian Assange, the court found that consent would be lacking if 
a jury accepted the complainants’ evidence that the defendant had sexual intercourse 
without a condom, or continued sexual intercourse after removing, damaging or tear-
ing a condom, after it had been made clear to him that consent was conditional on 
condom use.  
26. In the more recent decision of R (on the application of F) v DPP, a case which 
involved judicial review of a decision by the Crown Prosecution Service not to prose-
cute, the court found ejaculation in the defendant’s wife’s vagina to be inconsistent 
with consent under s. 74 in circumstances where she had made clear to him that sexu-
al intercourse was conditional on non-ejaculation, and ordered a review of the case.  
27. It is important, in my view, to make a number of observations about these cases, 
observations I consider relevant in determining the boundaries of consent under s. 74. 
In the first place, the cases of Assange and R (on the application of F) v DPP involved 
an express condition. That is, consent was subject to condom use in Assange and non-
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ejaculation in R (on the application of F) v DPP. There was no express condition in 
the case before us and any suggestion that a condition was or ought to be implied 
would raise difficulties for the Crown because to give legal effect to an implied condi-
tion would be tantamount to criminalising non-disclosure of personal information. 
This would clearly be at odds with the developing jurisprudence of this court. It 
would also potentially conflict with legal obligations under European and internation-
al law. Certainly, criminalisation of non-disclosure of information may conflict with 
privacy rights protected under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. In-
deed, the Yogyakarta Principles 2007, which articulate principles on the application 
of international human rights law in relation to sexual orientation and gender identity, 
state that:  
[t]he right to privacy ordinarily includes the choice to disclose or 
not to disclose information relating to one’s sexual orientation or 
gender identity, as well as decisions and choices regarding both 
one’s own body and consensual sexual and other relations with oth-
ers (principle 6).  
In relation to Article 8, the Law Commission has expressed reservation concerning its 
compatibility with prosecution of transgender people for non-disclosure of their gen-
der history: 
an apparent agreement to a sexual act by another should not be dis-
regarded merely because it is given under the impression that the 
other is male whereas the other is in fact female [sic], or vice versa, 
where the other has undergone sex reassignment surgery (Law 
Commission, Consent in Sex Offences: A Policy Paper: Appendix C 
of Setting the Boundaries, 2000 vol 2, para 5.32).  
Indeed, and putting to one side the Law Commission’s clumsiness in describing 
transgender people’s actual gender identities, since the Gender Recognition Act 2004 
and the Equality Act 2010, nothing now hinges, if it did previously, on whether a per-
son has undergone gender reassignment surgery or has had a Gender Recognition 
Certificate conferred upon them. This is entirely consistent with a right to privacy and 
with recognising the importance of self-determination.  
28. With the exception of R v Devonald [2008] EWCA Crim 527, a case where a fa-
ther pretended to be a 20-year old woman on the internet in order to seduce a young 
man to masturbate in front of a webcam as revenge for what he believed to have been 
the boy’s mistreatment of his daughter, other cases that have come before the Court of 
Appeal, and through which legal liability for sexual fraud has been expanded, involve 
the element of coercion. Thus in R v Bingham EWCA Crim 823, the defendant, hav-
ing created false identities on a social media website, blackmailed a female victim 
into engaging in sexual activity through the threatened use of sexually explicit photo-
graphs shared between the parties. In the earlier case of R v Jheeta [2007] EWCA 
Crim 1699 the Court of Appeal came to the same conclusion in relation to a fabricated 
threat of police sanction against the complainant. I note that the present case does not 
involve any element of coercion. Devonald, a case which, it should be noted, did in-
volve deception as to gender identity, can also be distinguished from the present facts. 
While there was neither coercion nor an express condition insisted on by the com-
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plainant, the interaction between the parties occurred entirely online and therefore an 
opportunity to verify the defendant’s credentials was more limited. Moreover, unlike 
the present facts, the deception in Devonald was unequivocal and the representation 
of female gender identity, trivial.  
29. In my view, and in accordance with these authorities, it is open to this court to 
conclude that vitiation of consent for the purposes of sexual fraud requires, not only 
active deception, but also either an express condition or the element of coercion, at 
least in circumstances where the parties meet face to face. Indeed, I favour such an 
approach, which has the virtue of limiting criminal liability in relation to sexual rela-
tions which are desire-led and where alleged harm consists in the retrospective 
reimagining of pleasure. However, I do not base my decision on such a demarcation 
of consent.  
Active deception 
30. I now turn to what I consider to be the crux of the case and, correspondingly, to 
my reasons for allowing the appeal. In order for the Crown case to be made out mens 
rea must be established. This requires proof not only that the appellant lacked a rea-
sonable belief in consent but also that she acted deceptively. In view of the evidence 
put before His Honour Judge Patrick and this court, it would appear that the claim of 
deception refers, in the main, to a series of allegedly false representations made by the 
appellant: the appellant’s use of the male pseudonym, ‘Scott Hill,’ both as an online 
avatar and subsequently in face to face meetings with the complainant; the appellant’s 
expression of a desire to marry and have children with the complainant; the appel-
lant’s stated desire to ‘put it in’ the complainant, which the complainant took to mean 
a reference to the appellant’s penis; and the appellant’s use of female pronouns in her 
witness statements. In addition to these representations, legal significance also ap-
pears to have been attributed to the fact that the appellant expressed ‘gender confu-
sion’ and to the fact that the complainant purchased condoms. 
31. If any of the representations constitute ‘active deception,’ as opposed to mere non-
disclosure of information, it is because they deliberately and actively misrepresent the 
appellant’s gender. In my view, it is, on the basis of the evidence, more than possible 
to conclude that they do not. I shall deal with each of these matters separately.  
32. First, the use of the male pseudonym, ‘Scott Hill,’ while deceptive in the sense 
that this was not the appellant’s legal name, was not necessarily deceptive in terms of 
the appellant’s gender identity. Indeed, the name is entirely consistent with a male 
gender identity and it is perhaps understandable that a transgender or gender non-
conforming person would, or at least might, adopt such a name.  
33. Second, the appellant’s assertion that she wanted to marry and have children with 
the complainant was not necessarily false. Marriage to the complainant would be pos-
sible if the appellant obtained a Gender Recognition Certificate and the couple would 
be able to have children either through adoption or in vitro fertilisation. The notion 
that the appellant might be transgender might seem surprising, and perhaps misplaced, 
given her present articulation of a female gender identity. However, and this goes to 
the heart of the case, the moment of legal liability arises not at the time of plea or this 
appeal, but at the time of the alleged offences, and there is evidence at this time to 
suggest the appellant identified as male. I shall come to this important evidence short-
ly.  
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34. Third, it appears to have been assumed that the appellant’s statement to the com-
plainant, that she wanted to ‘put it in’ the complainant, referred to a penis and is 
therefore deceptive. Yet, it is not deceptive as to gender as men are not defined by this 
anatomical part. If they were, legally recognised transgender men would not be con-
sidered men, nor, for example, would some of our injured soldiers returning from 
conflict zones. However, there is also an issue as to whether the statement is decep-
tive at all. The fact that the complainant appears to have assumed that the statement 
referred to a fleshy penis should not equate with the view that this was the appellant’s 
intent. Perhaps the appellant was referring to a prosthetic penis, which the evidence 
showed she possessed, and perhaps she experienced this device as other men would a 
fleshy penis. A serious difficulty I have with what appears to have been the treatment 
of this piece of evidence is the tendency to approach it, and questions of gender and 
embodiment more generally, from a perspective alien to the appellant.  
35. Fourth, the appellant’s use of female pronouns in witness statements does not nec-
essarily establish deception for legal purposes. This is because the appellant may have 
been referring to her birth-designated gender rather than her actual gender at the time. 
In any event, and despite the appellant’s present assertion of a female gender identity, 
there was evidence before His Honour Judge Patrick and this court, evidence I shall 
detail shortly, to conclude that the appellant did in fact identify as male at the time 
when criminal liability crystallises.  
36. Turning to the other evidence which might be considered to support a conclusion 
of deception, the appellant’s expression of ‘confusion’ regarding her gender identity 
did not take the form of a statement made to the complainant, and indeed only sur-
faced subsequent to the alleged offences. In any event, given the prejudice and mis-
understandings gender non-conforming people face in our society, confusion may not 
be uncommon. I certainly do not think that confusion should lead to a conclusion of 
fabrication. In relation to the final piece of evidence listed above, the complainant’s 
purchase of condoms assumed importance because purchase was considered incon-
sistent with the appellant’s (later retracted) statement that the complainant either knew 
or suspected that the appellant’s birth-designated gender was female. Yet, this inter-
pretation of the evidence, from which inferences appear to have been drawn regarding 
the appellant’s veracity, is not the only interpretation available. Thus, the complainant 
may have purchased condoms, not because she assumed the appellant to have a fleshy 
penis, which appears to have been what the Crown argued, but out of a concern over 
hygiene in the context of the intended use of the appellant’s prosthetic penis. Of 
course, we cannot know which interpretation is true. What appears clear however, is 
that all of these pieces of evidence can be interpreted in ways other than as supporting 
a claim of deception, and this raises the possibility, if not the likelihood, that a jury 
would have struggled to have been persuaded beyond reasonable doubt.  
37. In drawing attention to these possible alternative interpretations of the evidence, 
which, in my view, would be open to a jury, I recognise they depend on evidence that 
the appellant actually believed herself to be male, a transgender man that is, prior to 
and crucially at the time of the alleged offences. Evidence for this is not insignificant. 
Thus, the fact that the appellant presented as male, both online and throughout her 
face to face meetings with the complainant, and therefore for a period of some three 
to four years, might be viewed as consistent with a male gender identity, rather than 
as evidence of gender inauthenticity or fraud.  
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38. Further, the appellant had stated that she felt ‘more comfortable’ in the male gen-
der role and, prior to her assertion of a female gender identity before His Honour 
Judge Patrick, had stated an intention to undergo gender reassignment surgery. I note 
that according to recent medical studies, children continuing to express a gender iden-
tity opposite to their birth-designated gender after adolescence are highly likely to 
persist with their gender identification (T.D. Steensma, R. Biemond, F. de Boer and 
P.T. Cohen-Kettinis, ‘Desisting and Persisting Gender Dysphoria after Childhood: A 
Qualitative Follow-Up Study’ (2011) 16(4) Clinical Child Psychol Psychiatry 499-
516). While we cannot know why the appellant now asserts a female gender identity, 
it is possible it is associated with criminal prosecution as well as the negative media 
portrayal that, sadly, appears to attend coverage of the lives of transgender people 
caught up in our criminal justice system and more generally. In other words, I express 
concern that the appellant may have, so to speak, retreated into a cocoon of ‘normali-
ty.’ However, I do not base my judgment on evidence that the appellant is a 
transgender man.  
39. Indeed, even if she did not identify as male, but as a masculine woman, presenting 
as such and preferring to use a name traditionally associated with the male gender, as 
long as this was not done in order to deceive, then it does not follow that a deception 
has occurred as a matter of law. To conclude otherwise, would be to implicate law in 
unnecessary and unwarranted state intrusion and regulation of gender and sexuality. 
Such an approach would give the imprimatur of law to the idea that gender non-
conforming people are, by definition, duplicitous and/or that other people have a right 
to know intimate details about their personal and private lives.  
40. In my view, uncertainty as to whether active deception has been established ac-
cording to law renders the appellant’s conviction unsafe. However, I also express 
concern regarding the conclusion that the appellant lacked a reasonable belief in con-
sent. Of course, we cannot know what was in her mind at the relevant time. Neverthe-
less, I harbour concern regarding the difficulties both the appellant and other gender 
non-conforming people are likely to face in meeting a legal standard of ‘reasonable-
ness.’ I suspect that a claim made by, for example, a young transgender man, that he 
believed his sexual partner’s desire for him would have been unaffected by 
knowledge of his gender history, is one unlikely to resonate in normative terms and 
therefore with a jury. In this respect, I express concern that the truthful transgender or 
gender non-conforming defendant is likely to be equated with some kind of self-
loathing individual who can never legitimately or convincingly claim to be the object 
of another’s desire. While I do not base my decision on a failure to prove lack of rea-
sonable belief in consent, I do think these sorts of concerns point to very real dangers 
in regulating sexuality through the fraud mechanism, and certainly in the present con-
text.  
41. Ultimately, law, and especially criminal law, ought to respect the self-
determination that is implicit in gender identity claims unless it can be clearly estab-
lished that they are fabricated. For my part, I do not consider gender identity to be 
fabricated because it differs form birth-designated gender or because it is not static, or 
because it creates alarm in others.  
Conclusions 
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42. Accordingly, and for the reasons given, I consider the convictions in this case to 
be unsafe. For this reason, I would order a re-trial where a jury can consider the 
Crown’s case as well as other possible interpretations of the evidence.  
_____________ 
